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STRICT LIABILITY UNMASKED:
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Rapid developments that have taken place in the products liability
field during the past few years emphasize the importance of distin-
guishing between the concepts of strict liability and implied warranty.'
Although both of these concepts were developed to give the consumer
a remedy against manufacturers of defective products, their differences
have produced confusion in some courts.2 For example, when a specific
question arises as to which statute of limitations should be applied in
a strict liability action for personal injuries, conflicting opinions have
resulted. Some courts have held that strict liability is a tort remedy,
and that the tort statute of limitations, which begins to run at the
time of injury, should apply.3 Other courts reason that strict liability
is merely an extension of implied warranty and that the contract
statute of limitations, which runs from the time of sale, applies.
4
In Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,5 the plaintiff brought suit
in 1965 for injuries received earlier that year from what was alleged
to be a faulty glass door manufactured and installed in 1958 by the
defendant, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company. The issue presented was
whether an action for personal injuries which were caused by an un-
reasonably dangerous condition in a defective product is based upon
strict liability or implied warranty. In a four-to-three decision, the
Court of Appeals of New York stated that "strict liability in tort and
implied warranty in the absence of privity are merely different ways of
"See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 20o N.E.2d 182
(1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 8,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218
N.E.2d 185 (1966); Olney v. Beaman Bottling CO., 220 Tenn. 459, 418 S.W.2d
430 (1967).
'Compare Sides v. Richard Mach. Works, Inc., 4o6 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969)
(applying the tort statute of limitations which begins to run at the time of injury
and not at the time of sale) with Richmond Redev. & Housing Authority v. La-
barnum Constr. Crop., 195 Va. 827, 8o S.E.2d 574 (1954) (applying the contract
statute of limitations which begins to run at the time of sale rather than at the
time of injury).
3Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1969); Williams
v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (1968); Mickle v.
Blackmon, - S.C. -, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969); Holifield v. Steco Indus., Inc., 42
Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969).
'Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969); Jackson v. General Motors Corp., 441 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn.),
cert. denied, go S. Ct. 376 (1969).
'25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 3o5 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
CASE COMMENTS
describing ,the very same cause of action."6 In other words, the court
reasoned that strict liability is merely an extension to third party users
or consumers of the contract theory of implied warranty.7 Therefore,
the plaintiff was barred from bringing a personal injury suit against
the manufacturer because the action sounded in contract, not tort,
and thus should be governed by the contract statute of limitations.8
According to the court, this statute of limitations began to run at the
time of sale in 1958 and had expired before the plaintiff was injured
in 1965.
The dissenting judges rejected the idea that strict liability and
implied warranty are essentially the same cause of action sounding in
contract. Rather, they reasoned that tort law should govern because
this was a personal injury action and there is no cause of action until
an injury occurs.9 This would avoid placing the plaintiff in the anoma-
Old. at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
WMendel cited the leading case of Goldberg v, Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
12 N.Y.2d 432, x91 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), as support for this extension
of implied warranty. Goldberg involved an action for the wrongful death of an
airplane passenger brought against the air carrier, the manufacturer of the air-
plane, and the manufacturer of the faulty altimeter which allegedly caused the
crash. The Court of Appeals of New York held that the airplane manufacturer's
implied warranty of fitness ran in favor of passengers despite their lack of privity.
However, it should be pointed out that the court also felt that strict tort
liability was a more accurate description for the liability being imposed. In addi-
tion, the court stated:
A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the
sale contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong
suable by a non-contracting party whose use of the warranted article
is within the reasonable contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer.
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., x2 N.Y.2d 532, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (1963).
sCompare N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1969) with N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAw § 214 (McKinney 1963). The two New York statutory provisions differ
in that the contract statute of limitations begins to run at the time of sale and
is six years long, whereas the tort statute of limitations begins to run at
the time of injury and is three years long. The court's refusal to apply the tort
statute of limitations was based on its fear of unfounded lawsuits being brought
against manufacturers many years after the product -had been sold. The
majority felt that applying the contract statute of limitations would prevent
these unfounded suits in the products liability field. 253 N.E.2d at 21o, 305
N.Y..S.2d at 495.
'The dissent's justification for applying the tort statute of limitations to a
strict liability action was that the plaintiff still has the burden of proving that
his injury was the result of a defectively manufactured -product. This burden
would become more difficult to sustain with the passage of time because of the
intervening factors of maintenance and depreciation. 253 N.E.2d at 213-14, 305
N.YS.2d at 499-
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lous situation of being expected to bring a cause of action before she
even had one. The dissent also argued that although the plaintiff had
asserted a contractual theory of implied warranty in her pleadings,
she had stated facts sufficient to allege a cause of action in tort under
strict liability. Therefore, the plaintiff should have been able either to
recover on this latter basis or to amend her complaint,10 instead of
being left entirely without a remedy for her injury.
Because of a lack of precedent during the early stages of products
liability development, many legal devices were utilized to hold manu-
facturers liable when their defective products caused personal harm.11
However, the concepts of implied warranty and strict liability gradu-
ally emerged as the best routes of recovery for the injured consumer,'
2
and results in cases such as Mendel can be traced to a similarity in
development between the two.
In warranty, traditional economic policies of laissez-faire, as well
as a fear that manufacturers would be subjected to unfounded and
harassing law suits, enabled contract principles of privity to insulate
manufacturers from liability for their defective products. 3 The trend
today is away from theories of laissez-faire and towards consumer
protection.' 4 Consequently, the privity requirement set forth in cases
such as Winterbottom v. Wright1 and Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing
Machine Co.16 has been gradually discarded. The result is that the
manufacturer's liability for defective products has been extended to
"The dissent stated:
There is a pleading problem in this case. Plaintiffs in their "breach
of warranty" causes of action have conservatively followed the "con-
tractural" format.... However, the pleading issue is hardly the nub of
this case, and the unesthetic pleading may be easily corrected by allowing
a repleading to restate those causes of action for the pure tort in strict
liability that they are ....
253 N.E.2d at 214, 3o5 N.Y.S.2d at 5oo-o.
"See Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 153-55
(1958). The author lists twenty-nine different devices used by courts to award
damages to an injured customer who was not in privity with his seller.
1"Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 5o
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
"Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., izo F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); W.
PRossER, LAw OF TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964); Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part
II, judicial Law Making, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 115, 131-32 (1962).
"W. PROssER, LAW oF ToRTs § 96 (3d ed. 1964); Green, The Thrust of Tort
Law, Part 1I, Judicial Law Making, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 115, 131-32 (1962).
3152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
"1o F. 865 (8th Cir. 19o3).
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remote buyers and consumers,17 and the doctrine of implied warranty
without privity has gained increasing support in the law of sales s and
under the Uniform Commercial Code.19
Strict liability developed along similar lines, and application of
liability without fault quickly progressed from manufacturers of bad
foodstuffs20 to manufacturers of products for intimate bodily use.
21
In recent years, this concept has been extended to any manufacturer
whose defective product causes physical harm to the consumer or
user.
22
With the corresponding elimination of privity in contract actions
and negligence in tort actions, various courts began to confuse the con-
cepts of implied warranty and strict liability.23 The result was a hap-
hazard manipulation of warranty concepts in order to allow an injured
rMacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. io5o (1916) is the
leading decision in this area. The Court held that privity of contract was un-
necessary for a tort action in a products liability case. Accord, Stewart v. Cox,
55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961); Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 21o N.E.2d 182 (1965); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44
N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio
St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
"Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149
(gth Cir. 1962); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963);
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rav. 79,
(1966).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314,-315. But, it is important to note that,
in order to prevent further confusion in the products liability field, the Uniform
Commercial Code has adopted a neutral position as to strict liability. Comment
3 of § 2-318 states:
Liability: This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its pro-
visions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this,
the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the de-
veloping case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer
who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
2Stanfield v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117, 53 P.2d 878 (1936);
Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N.W. 428 (igog);
Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Hughes, 131 Ohio St. 5o, 3 N.E.2d 415 (1936);
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
2LGraham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (dictum)
(hair dye); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., io6 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d
181 (1958) (permanent wave solution).
2Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 21o N.E.2d
182 (1965); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 22o A.2d 853 (1966); cf. Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
2Cases cited note 2 supra.
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plaintiff to recover from a manufacturer of defective products.
24
Fortunately, some courts have recognized the need for separating
the concepts of strict liability and implied warranty in order to avoid
more confusion in products liabiltiy law. Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.25 was one of the first cases to offer a solution to this
problem in that it held that strict liability in tort should preempt
implied warranty in the personal injury field.2 6 The court further
noted that the law of contracts and sales (now the Uniform Com-
mercial Code27 in most states) would still play an important role in
defining a manufacturer's liability for a purely economic loss as dis-
tinguished from physical injury losses. In 1965, the American Law
Institute followed suit 28 by setting forth strict liabiltiy as a separate
tort remedy.29 However, strict liability was limited to physical harm
24See Heinemann v. Barfield, 136 Ark. 500, 207 S.W. 62 (igi8); Spence v.
Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. i2o, 90 N.W.2d 8 73
(1958); DiVello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 515, 1o2 N.E.2d 289
(C.P. 1951).
059 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
nThe Supreme Court of California has stated that:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer
to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract be-
tween them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement
but imposed by law ... and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to
define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products ... make
clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contact war-
ranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining
the governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of
commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manu-
facturer's liability to those injured by its defective products unless those
rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); accord, Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 5o2 (1965)
(dissenting opinion).
21E. FARNSWORT- & J. HONNOLD, SUPPLEMENT FOR USE WITH CASES AND MATERIALS
ON COMMERCIAL LAW, Table 1 (1968).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965)
nComment M of § 402 A states:
The basis of liability is purely one in tort. A number of courts, seeking
a theoretical basis for the liability, have resorted to a "warranty," either
running with the goods sold, by analogy to convenants running with the
land, or made directly to the consumer without contract. In some instances
this theory has proved to be an unfortunate one. Although warranty was
in its origin a matter of tort liability ... it has become so identified in
practice with a contract of sale between the plaintiff and defendant
that the warranty theory has become something of an obstacle to the
recognition of the strict liability where there is no such contract....
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the
Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to
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to the consumer or user.30 Implicit in this limitation is the suggestion
that strict liability is designed to cover physical injury resulting from
a defective product and is therefore governed by tort law, whereas
implied warranty is better equipped to deal with economic loss and is
governed by sales law and the Uniform Commercial Code.31
Seely v. White Motor Co, 32 seems to support this distinction by
holding that recovery for commercial loss must be on a warranty
theory because strict liability in tort will not extend to the recovery
of lost economic expectations in the absence of an express agreement
by the manufacturer to cover that risk.33 The court further states:
The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates
that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions
of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather,
to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.34
However, a court's classification of strict liability as a -tort or con-
tract remedy should not be made solely on the basis of historical de-
velopment or current trend. Rather, consideration must first be given
to how such a classification will effect the specific problem involved,
for once the decision is made as to which rules govern the action, the
question of the applicable statute of limitations becomes moot.
On one side of the argument there are cases such as Mendel which
hold that strict liability is merely an extension to consumers and users
of the contract concept of implied warranty, and consequently, that
the contract statute of limitations should be applied.3 5 Courts favor-
warranties; and it is not affected by limitations on the scope and content
of warranties, or by limitation to "buyer" or "seller" in those statutes...
In short, ("warranty" must be given a new and different meaning if
it is used in connection with this Section. It is much simpler to regard
the liability here stated as merely one of strict liability in tort.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 4o2 A comment m at
355-56 (1965).
0RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965).
3'Note 29 supra.
w63 Cal. 2d 30, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
'Old.; acord, Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); cf. Rhodes
Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 I1. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726
(1966); contra, Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 2o7 A.2d 305
(1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
"Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953);
Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d
413 (1962).
Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725(2), "[a] cause of action accrues
when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of
the breach."
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ing this argument reason that the injury-producing defect may have
resulted from such intervening factors as depredation, misuse, or
faulty maintenance rather than from the manufacturing process.
Running the statute of limitations from the time of sale will reduce
the possibility of a manufacturer being held liable for defects caused
by one of these intervening factors.36 As the court in Mendel stated,
We are willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious
claims that might arise after the statutory period has run in
order to prevent the many unfounded suits that would be
brought and sustained against manufacturers ad infinitum.
3 7
In addition, there is the public policy consideration of placing too
much of a burden on manufacturers by requiring them to market
items which must remain completely free from deterioration over a
long period of time after production.3 s Running the statute of limita-
tions for a definite period of time after sale in a products liability suit,
rather than suspending the statute indefinitely until time of injury,
will prevent manufacturers from being subjected to such rigorous
standards.
In contrast, other courts have found that public policy in their
jurisdictions favors holding manufacturers liable in tort for any
original defect which causes physical injury, regardless of a long lapse
of time.3 9 These courts feel that a mere passage of time between pro-
duction and injury should not defeat application of the tort statute
of limitations.40 The imposition of strict tort liability in this situation
is justified on the ground that an ever-increasing group of consumers
is forced to rely on the skill and care of manufacturers in turning out
non-defective products.
41
Furthermore, a court's application of the tort statute of limitations
in a strict liability action is supported by the current trend toward
-"See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
3o5 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969); cf. Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So. 2d 331
(Fla. 1969).
37253 N.E.2d at 21o, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495; accord, Jackson v. General Motors
Corp., 441 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 9o S. Ct. 376 (1969).
38See Treviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1969) (dicta);
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d
490 (1969).
9Mickle v. Blackmon, - S.C. -, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969); Holifield v. Setco
Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 75o, 168 N.W.2d 177 (96g).
4'Cases cited note 39 supra.
"W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTs § 97 (3d ed. 1964); Freedman, "Defect" in the
Product: The Necessary Basis for Products Liability in Tort and in Warranty,
33 TENN. L. REV. 323 (1966); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective
Products: The Road To and Past Vandermark; 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1965);
Percy, Products Liability-Tort or Contract or What?; 4o TUL. L. REv. 715 (1966).
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classification of strict liability as a separate remedy in tort for personal
injury, independent of the contract remedy of implied warranty.
42
This separate classification has resulted from the realization that
bringing a personal injury suit on a contractual theory may result in
an injured plaintiff's being deprived of his cause of action because of
such technicalities as disclaimer 43 and requirement of notice.4 4 With
the current emphasis on consumer protection, this treatment of strict
liability would prevent manufacturers from escaping the imposition
of liability through the mechanisms of sales law if their defective pro-
ducts cause physical injury to consumers or users.
4 5
"As of March, 1970, at least twenty-six state courts or federal courts applying
state law, plus the District of Columbia, have apparently adopted strict liability
as a tort remedy. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (gth Cir. 1968)
(applying Montana law); Klimas v. International Tel & Tel. Corp., 297 F. Supp.
937 (D.R.I. 1969); Newton v. Admiralty Corp., 280 F. Supp. 202 (D. Colo. 1967);
Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.S.D. 1967); Greeno v. Clark
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler
Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969); O.S Stapley Co. v. Miller, 1o3 Ariz. 556,
447 P.2d 248 (1968); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d
189 (1965); Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mun.
Ct. App. 1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 11. 2d 612, 20o N.E.2d 182 (1965);
Dealers Tramp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Arnold
v. United States Rubber Co., 203 So. 2d 764 (La. Ct. App. 1967); McCormack
v. Hankcraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); State Stove Mfg. Co.
v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966); Kenner v.
Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. i969); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Dolinski, 83 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio
St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d x85 (1966); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d
90 (Okla. 1965); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 267, 435 P.2d 806 (1967);
Webb v. Zer, 422 Pa. 424, 22o A.2d 853 (1966); Olney v. Beaman Bottling Co.,
2.o Tenn. 459, 418 S.W.2d 430 (1967); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787 Tex. (1967); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 212 A.2d
69 (1965); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729 (Wash. 1969); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
I"Sharples Separator Co. v. Domestic Elec. Refrig. Corp., 61 F.2d 499 (3d Cir.
1932); Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa.
1968); Traylor Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. National Container Corp, 45 Del. 143, 70
A.2d 9 (Super. Ct. 1949); Kolodzcak v. Peerless Motor Co., 225 Mich. 47, 237
N.W. 41 (1931); Gibson v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 29 Wash. 2d 6i1, 188
P.2d 316 (1948).
"American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.,
7 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1925); Smith v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 122 So.
591 (196o); American Furniture Co. v. Veazie, 131 Colo. 340, 281 P.2d 803 (1955);
De Lucia v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., i39 Conn. 65, 89 A.2d 749 (1952); Bruns v.
Jordan Marsh Co., 3o5 Mass. 437. 26 N.E. 2d 368 (194o).
'1 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
It seems ironic, in light of the Mendel ruling, that a federal court in New
York would say sixty years ago that "[t]he remedies of injured consumers ought
1970]
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A more obvious reason for utilizing the tort statute of limitations
in a products liability action is that it insures that plaintiff's cause of
action for personal injuries will not be barred before it has accrued,
as was the case in Mendel. Such an illogical result would seem to be
directly contrary to the accepted purposes of the statutes of limita-
tions.46 For, while statutes of limitations are statutes of repose, in-
tended to encourage promptness in the bringing of actions to insure
that none of the pertinent evidence will be lost or destroyed,47 they are
certainly not intended to deprive a party of his rights before they
accrue.
48
The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently avoided this prob-
lem in Mickle v. Blackmon.4 9 The court imposed strict liability on
the manufacturer even though the product, a gearshift knob, was thir-
teen years old when it shattered in an auto accident causing serious
and permanent injuries as a result of the plaintiff's being impaled on
it. The court held that neither a long passage of time nor ownership
changes should be sufficient to defeat recovery if the plaintiff can
prove an original defect in the article was the proximate cause of in-
jury.
A final factor to be considered is that an injured plaintiff may rely
solely on the contract remedy of implied warranty as his basis for re-
covery. This could dircetly influence a court in its treatment of the
action and in its application of the statute of limitations, especially
where, as in Mendel, the case has gone all the way to the highest court
not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales." Ketterer v.
Armour & Co., 2oo F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
"The United States Supreme Court, in a slightly different situation, realized
the potential harshness of this approach as applied to personal injury cases in
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949):
We do not think that the humane legislative plan intended such conse-
quences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those conse-
quences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of
limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims within
a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights.
Id. at 170.
',7Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 US. 657, 672 (1913); Knoxville v.
Gervin, 169 Tern. 537, 89 S.W.2d 348 (1936).
Of course, statutes of limitations also have other purposes, such as to prevent
undue delay in bringing suit or claims [(Federal Reserve Bank v. Atlanta Trust
Co., 91 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 US. 738 (1937)] or to suppress
fraudulent and stale claims from being asserted. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Pine v. State Indus. Comm'n., 148 Okla. 2oo, 298 P.
276 (1931).
"8Cf. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
40- S.C. -, 166 SE.2d 173 (1969).
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of a state without amendment of the pleadings. The refusal of a court
to allow a repleading or an amendment of the pleadings at such a late
date has been held to be within the discretion of the court.50 Although
this point was not discussed in Mendel, the court there may have felt
that allowing the plaintiff to replead in tort, after originally bringing
her case on a contract theory, would be highly prejudicial to the de-
fendant at that stage of the proceedings.
The ultimate effect of classifying strict liability as a tort remedy
will be to run the statute of limitations indefinitely until a defect in
the product causes injury to the consumer or user.51 Holding a manu-
facturer or seller liable for an indefinite period of time after sale
would appear to be unjust,5 2 but it would be even more undesirable
to bar a plaintiff's cause of action for personal injuries before it even
existed, as the New York court did in Mendel. What the court there
may have failed to realize is that while implied warranty is pertinent
to cases of economic loss in the products liability area, it is not
equipped to deal with cases involving personal injury.53 On the other
hand, tort law, especially that area of it known as strict liability, can
deal effectively with personal injuries. As Prosser states, "If there is to
be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort, declared
outright, without an illusory contract mask."54 If the Court of Appeals
of New York had followed the modem trend in products liability law
by removing this mask and applying the tort statute of limitations,
Mrs. Mendel would not have been denied her cause of action.55
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rThe Pennsylvania supreme court was presented with this problem in 1966.
In Miller v. Preitz, 442 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966), the court sustained a manu-
facturer's demurrer although recognizing the policy considerations behind impos-
ing strict liability in tort upon those who put defective goods on the market.
The court refused to impose strict liability because the plaintiff had not sought
recovery on such a basis. However, in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853
(1966), decided later that same year, the Pennsylvania supreme court distinguished
Miller and adopted § 402 A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Reasoning
that since the plaintiff had broadly pleaded facts necessary to establish a cause
of action based on strict liability, the court held that he should be permitted
to amend his complaint for retrial,
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